WMNs (Wireless Mesh Networks) are a new wireless broadband network structure based completely on IP technologies and have rapidly become a broadband access measure to offer high capacity, high speed and wide coverage. WMN is such a network that doesn't need to rely on fixed infrastructure and is operated over an open, wireless medium. Any user within the covered area of radio wave may access the network. Therefore, authentication for network access is the first line of defense that can prevent unauthorized users from accessing the network. An authentication scheme is thus a key mechanism to ensure secure access. In this paper, we propose a trusted authentication protocol based on Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in which the validity of both the user and the terminal device is verified. Thus, only trusted terminals used by legal users are allowed to access a WMN.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless Mesh Network (WMN) is becoming a hot topic in the research of wireless networks. WMN is a special form of mobile AD HOC network, a new broadband wireless network architecture, and an integration of wireless local area network (WLAN). The WMN technology can be acted as "the last mile" in the communications network, wireless metropolitan area networks, wireless sensor networks, and wireless LAN network. WMN integrates various existing wireless technologies, such as the IEEE 802.11 WLANs [1] , IEEE 802. 16 Broadband WMANs [2] , the IEEE 802. 15 WPANs [3] , and even cellular phone network. Via WMN technology, the mobile user can connect to the Internet to enjoy the service at any time, from any location. Due to WMN has fixed and sufficient power backbone routers, the issue of mobility and energy consumption is less to consider. In order to allow WMN become an important extension of the wired network or even to replace part of the cable network, improving network communication capacity and communication quality [4, 5, 6] , and providing safe access scheme are WMN research required to solve. The large WMN requires a large number of keys, how these keys are securely generated, updated and revoked is a very complex and difficult problem. It is very important to design a safe WMN authentication model that is responsible for the mobile nodes accessing, identification authentication and key distribution [7, 8, 9, 10, 11] .
Security is a crucial and urgent problem in WMN as in other types of networks. In a wired network, data are transmitted to its destination through electric cables, so leakage can happen only when the physical links are under attack. In a wireless network, data are transmitted through an open space and any node in the coverage can receive the radio signals. Moreover, in WMN, the external environment can be more serious due to the lack of central administration. Therefore, malicious attacks are more difficult to detect and the credibility of wireless nodes must also be guaranteed. Before a user accesses WMN, the network must verify the user's identity and determine the relevant permissions [12] [13, 14] . Only users and terminals that are successfully authorized are permitted to access the network and network resources. Access authentication in WMN is thus the foundation for secure and reliable communication between wireless nodes.
In this paper, we propose trusted authentication protocols based on TPM in which not only the user's validity but also the terminal device's validity is verified. Thus, only a trusted terminal belonged to a legal user is allowed to access a WMN.
II. RELATED WORK
Past practice of information security has demonstrated that most security problems result not from the network but more from terminal nodes. The original idea of trusted computing was proposed to ensure the security of network terminals. After years of development, from Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA) in 1999 to Trusted International Conference on Computer Science and Service System (CSSS 2014)
Computing Group (TCG) in 2003 [15, 16] , a series of technical specifications such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Storage, etc. have been proposed.
Trusted computing is used to guarantee the security of an entire computer system. First, a root of trust is assured to construct a chain of trust from the root to the hardware platform to the operation system and then to applications. Trust can thus be established for the entire system through graded authentications and trusts. Together with the BIOS, a TPM forms the root of trust which contains one or more Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) that allow a secure storage and reporting of security relevant metrics. TPM can be used to authenticate hardware devices. Since each TPM chip has a unique and secret RSA key burned in when it is produced, it is capable of performing platform authentication. For example, it can be used to verify that a system seeking access is the expected system [17] . Each TPM has its own Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs) within a valid certificate CertAIK issued by its producer.
The Trusted Network Connect (TNC) architecture based on trusted computing technologies establishes connections from the viewpoint of the integrity of the terminals in which there are three types of entities: access requestor (AR), policy enforcement point (PEP) and policy decision point (PDP) [18] . The basic concept is that the embedded TPM's information of wireless devices must be checked first and only those that meet the security policy of the network can be allowed to access the network. So a terminal with potential threat cannot access the network directly. At the same time, a terminal can verify its associated AP's security and would only connect to a network that satisfies its security demands. We assume a zone-based hierarchical network model for WMN in this paper as shown in Fig. 1 in which dashed and solid lines indicate wireless and wired links, respectively [19] . 
III. KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY

A. Certificate
To achieve better security, key pair generation and key agreement protocol adopted in this paper are all based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) because ECC offers security comparable to others while with smaller key sizes and faster computation speed.
All cryptography is built on a suitably chosen elliptic curve E defined over a finite field Fq of characteristic p and a base point P∈E(Fq). As described in [20] , some domain parameters are defined as follows:
(1) A field size q, where q is a prime power (in practice, either q = p, an odd prime, or q = 2 m );
(2) An indication FR (field representation) of the representation used for the elements of Fq;
(3) Two field elements a and b in Fq which define the equation of the elliptic curve E over Fq (e.g., y 2 =x 3 +ax+b when p > 3 and y 2 +xy=x 3 +ax 2 +b when p = 2);
(4) A finite point P = (x P , y P ) of prime order in E(Fq ) and P≠O where O denotes the point at infinity; (5) The order n of the point P with nP=O and n > 2 160 as commonly recommended; 
We can see that, K= hs A (R B +R B W B )= hs B (R A +R A W A )=h (r A r B +r A w B R B + r B w A R A + w A w B R A R B ) P.
IV. TRUSTED AUTHENTICATIONS
A. Backbone Router
Before accessing the network, a new mesh router BR A is supposed to have a valid certificate Cert A issued by the offline CA. In order to get the private key SK of the system, it needs to be authenticated by at least t routers and get their key pieces. As in TNC architecture, the existing backbone router BR B plays a role as the PEP and PDP, while BR A is an AR. There are five steps to accomplish an authentication as illustrated in Fig. 2: (1) BR A sends an access request to BR B 
B. Access Point
Unlike the backbone mesh routers, an ordinary AP in zone networks should not get the private key SK of the backbone network. Instead, it can communicate with a border mesh router, and shared a temporary session key with the router. Two entities AP and BR can complete the key agreement with their key pair (w, W) in their certificates, as described in the section "Key Agreement". AP BR Figure. 3 Interactions of AP's Authentication
As in TNC architecture, the border mesh router BR plays a role as the PEP and PDP, while AP is an AR. When they finish the interaction as illustrated in Fig. 3 and exchange RAP and RBR, the AP and BR can share the session key to be used in their next communication.
C. Roam and Handoff
When a terminal switches a handoff from one zone network to another, or requests a roam service in a foreign zone, compatibility of security policies between different zones or between foreign and home zone needs to be considered. If they are compatible, then the handoff or roam can be processed smoothly. Or else, they must start a negotiation first. For example, a normal personal laptop cannot easily move from his LAN to a high secure military zone.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Contrast simulations between the protocol TA (Terminal's Authentication) we proposed and TWMAP proposed in [21, 22] are carried out using the simulating software OPNET 10.5A under Windows XP.
We carry out 50 simulations in total, in which the number of requesting terminals increases from 1 to 50 in 0.5 second. Through the simulations, we compare (1) the success ratio of authentication which is the number of terminals successfully access the network divided by the total number of requesting terminals in Fig.4 and (2) 
Figure. 5 Average Delay of Two Protocols
We can see that, in both success ratio and average delay, the TA protocol is better than MN-TAP. Since there are more interactions between the PEP and PDP in MN-TAP, it brings a much longer authentication time and a smaller success ratio.
VI. CONCLUSION
Authentication in wireless networks is very important, which usually is viewed as the first defense of the network. Trusted authentications in WMNs are proposed in this paper based on several technologies, such as hierarchical network model, ECC, (t, n) threshold cryptographic method, and TPM.
Because of its volatile topology and the characteristics of multi-hop in WMN, authentication success rate is not high enough, and authentication delay is long. In later work, according to its characteristics of WMN, we should increase the success rate and reduce the authentication delay, and provide some valuable results to security research of WMN. Moreover, trusted handoff and roaming in WMNs will be paid more attention to improve our protocol.
